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Aristotle declares in Nicomachean Ethics I.3, ‘It is the mark of an educated man to look for 
precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits’ (1094b23-5). This 
has commonly been taken to invite readings of the NE that detach it from any metaphysical or 
scientific background. Devin Henry and Karen Nielsen have put together a compilation that 
corrects that, and perceives or provides more philosophical underpinning in or for the text than is 
evidently present or indicated. Given the excellence of the thirteen contributors (besides the 
editors, Allen, Charles, Gill, Karbowski, Devereux, Natali, Lennox, Leunissen, Shields, Johnson, 
Witt), the upshot is often illuminating, and will help those who wish to read the NE (or the 
Eudemian Ethics) in the light of other and more central Aristotelian texts. 
 Some doubts may nonetheless arise. It should help to distinguish two questions (though one 
may be uncertain how best to formulate the second): (1) Can themes in the NE be significantly 
illuminated by drawing upon other works? (2) Does Aristotle intend the reader to grasp and 
assess the argument of the NE through an understanding of those connections? 
 It is possible to answer (1) positively, but (2) negatively. I select a single example. 
Christopher Shields focuses upon the function argument in I.7, which demands that any 
candidate human ergon be idion to human beings. What here is the sense of idion? Shields 
suggests four possibilities (p. 144): (i) being unique; (ii) being more deeply characteristic; (iii) 
being a proprium, viz. ‘a non-trivially necessary but non-essential feature’; and (iv) being 
essential. (iv) is a significant notion, but not an attested sense of idion. (i) can be trivialized: it is 
‘unique to human beings, as a species, that some of its members design and build nuclear power 
plants’. No doubt Aristotle intended no such piece of artifice, and so (ii) may capture more of his 
thought: he wants something that is koinon to all, and only, non-defective human beings. Yet 
there is no ground to narrow the sense of idios beyond the contrast with koinon; and what his 
actual argument requires, for its exclusion of digestion and even perception from the human 
function, is a necessary condition, and not a sufficient one. Hence, for his immediate purposes, 
sense (i) suffices. 
 Perhaps more pertinent is another observation by Shields. Evident within the broad options 
which are all that I.7 surveys is Aristotle’s own stratification of the human soul into three layers, 
vegetative, perceptual, and rational. Less clear is whether the great sketchiness of its 
adumbration here points the reader elsewhere, or, at most, anticipates what is set out more 
explicitly in I.13. (Shields accepts as genuine the sentence at 1098a4-5, which can only be read 
as a cryptic reference forward; however, editors other than Bywater have plausibly read it as an 
intrusion from a marginal note.) One might say that I.7 insinuates what the De Anima elucidates; 
it proceeds on its way without inviting any deeper immersion. 
 So just what is at issue? The editors take issue (p. 2) with two statements by Richard Kraut 
that I distinguish: (a) ‘[Aristotle] never proposes that students of ethics need to engage in a 
specialized study of the natural world …’; (b) ‘His project is to make ethics an autonomous field, 
and to show why a full understanding of what is good does not require expertise in any other 
field.’ Surely (a) is true of the NE, where he writes, ‘Further precision is perhaps something more 
laborious than our purposes require’ (I.13 1102a25-6, and cf. I.3 1094b11-14, I.6 1096b30-1). 
However, (b) seems imprudent unless we replace ‘full’ by ‘adequate’ (sc. for those purposes). 
The editors intend this volume to explore how far ‘Aristotle’s ethical treatises make use of the 
concepts, methods and practices developed in the Analytics and the other scientific works’ (p. 
12). That they make use of such concepts – one may be more doubtful of ‘methods and practices’ 
– is certain. 
 Coincidentally, this collection emerges in the same year as a related monograph, Dominic 
Scott’s Levels of Argument: A Comparative Study of Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics (OUP). That has the advantage in clarity of a single author; and its 
distinction, after Plato, between a ‘longer’ and a ‘shorter’ route for political science, and its 
thesis that the NE prefers the second, are unlikely to be unsettled by any of the minuter 
discussions in the present volume. 
 This has a concise index and a composite bibliography; it lacks the utility of an index 
locorum. 
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